The Internal Revenue Service\u27s  Contribution  to the Health Problems of the Poor by Rose, Marilyn G.
Catholic University Law Review 
Volume 21 
Issue 1 Fall 1971 Article 3 
1971 
The Internal Revenue Service's "Contribution" to the Health 
Problems of the Poor 
Marilyn G. Rose 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Marilyn G. Rose, The Internal Revenue Service's "Contribution" to the Health Problems of the Poor, 21 
Cath. U. L. Rev. 35 (1972). 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.edu/lawreview/vol21/iss1/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by CUA Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted 
for inclusion in Catholic University Law Review by an authorized editor of CUA Law Scholarship Repository. For 
more information, please contact edinger@law.edu. 
The Internal Revenue Service's "Contribution" to the
Health Problems of the Poor
Marilyn G. Rose*
The existence of a health crisis in this, country is universally acknowledged.
While the costs of medical and hospital care have far out-distanced the
inflationary spiral in the consumer price index over the past decade, I the health
status of the American population vis-a-vis the rest of the industrialized world
has seriously deteriorated. 2 At the same time the public hospitals have become
progressively more overcrowded, underfinanced and understaffed. In the past
two years these hospitals have also faced threatened loss of accreditations, have
been forced to shut down facilities and services, and have been sued by both
* A.B., Brandeis University, LL.B., Harvard University, Chief Special Litigation, National
Legal Program on Health Problems of the Poor.
The author wishes to acknowledge the valuable assistance of Lawrence Hait, J.D., 1970,
U.C.L.A., and George Schraer, J.D., 1970, U.C.L.A.
I. Since 1950, health expenditures have risen more than 400 percent. If we compare the rise
in the per diem cost of hospital care against the overall consumer price index since 1959 (the last
base period), we find that by 1969 hospital costs soared over 250 percent of the 1959 rate while
the overall CPI reflected a 125 percent rise. See COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL HEALTH INSURANCE,
WHY HEALTH SECURITY 15-16 (1971). The most dramatic upturn occurred after 1965, for two
reasons: (I) the advent of Medicare and Medicaid, 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395-1396 (Supp. V, 1970), gave
the aged (those over 65) and the poor (chiefly categorical assistance recipients) government-paid
hospital coverage, thus putting more demand into an economic system in which cost fluctuates
with demand; (2) the Fair Labor Standards Amendments of 1966 extended that Act to cover
hospital workers, 29 U.S.C. § 203 (Supp. V, 1970), thus partially eliminating the subsidization
of the health care system by the working poor employed by the hospital system.
2. E.g., in 1951-53 the United States ranked lowest among 15 industrialized countries in
maternal mortality; by 1966 it dropped to seventh among these same countries; 22 WORLD HEALTH
STATISTICS REPORT No. 6 (1970).
In none of the areas of major health status measurements does the United States rank high.
In 1968 the United States ranked 13th among a selected group of developed countries in infant
mortality; UNITED NATIONS, POPULATION, AND VITAL STATISTICS REPORT, Series A, XXII, No.
I (1970). In the same year the United States also ranked 18th in male and I lth in female life
expectancy among other industrial countries. See generally COMMITTEE FOR NATIONAL HEALTH
INSURANCE, WHY HEALTH SECURITY 1-8 (1971). See P. DEVISE, SLUM MEDICINE: CHICAGO'S
APARTHEID HEALTH SYSTEM, ch. 1 (1969), for a description of the interrelationship between poverty
and health status in a major American city.
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poor people and young doctors charging that the hospitals are not complying
with minimum standards of medical care in violation of statutory, regulatory,
and constitutional obligations.' During the same period private hospitals have
begun to abandon their historic charitable mission and have closed their doors
to persons unable to pay for medical services.' The nearly 40 million persons
without hospital and medical insurance have been trapped between insufficient
services in the public hospital sector and denial of admission into the private
sector. Groups ranging from the American Medical Association to the United
Automobile Workers have proposed legislative solutions, and the twin issues
3. Underfinancing, shutdown services, accreditation problems, and quality-of-care standards
are all related. With respect to accreditation, Cook County Hospital in Chicago was on the verge
of complete shutdown as a result of political interference in the running of the hospital and
deplorable patient care conditiong. See Chicago Daily News, May 20, 1970, at I, col. I. It was
given a one-year provisional accreditation in 1970 by the Joint Commission on Hospital
Accreditation. Similarly, D.C. General Hospital in Washington, DC., was given a one-year
provisional accreditation in 1970 (See HOSPITAL WEEK, Sept. 4, 1970), and was sued in 1971 for
failing to provide minimum standards of medical care. Greater Washington D.C. Area Council
of Senior Citizens v. D.C. General, Civil No. 275-71 (D.D.C. 1971). Boston City Hospital lost
its accreditation in January 1970, but thereafter was given a one-year provisional accreditation;
St. Louis City Hospital was disaccredited in September 1969. 27 MED. CARE REV. 584-85 (1970).
In Los Angeles some 75 interns and residents in internal medicine brought suit against the Los
Angeles General Hospital, challenging the quality of care which conditions there forced them to
render to patients. Fisher v. Los Angeles County, Civ. No. 968621 (Super. Ct. L.A. County 1969).
A subsequent review by the Board of Supervisors (Final Report on Investigation of Charges Made
by Young Doctors, April 13, 1971) and independent charges brought by "establishment" surgeons
(Los Angeles Times, June 3, 197 1, at I, col. I), confirmed many of the allegations. In New Orleans,
lack of funds caused Charity Hospital to temporarily close down 500 of its 2100 beds in May
1970, at a time when it was daily turning away 25 to 50 patients who ordinarily would have been
admitted as inpatients at private hospitals; it was subsequently named as a defendant along with
ten private and district hospitals in the New Orleans metropolitan area in an action charging,
inter alia, discrimination against the poor. Cook v. Ochsner Foundation Hosp. 319 F. Supp. 603
(E.D. La. 1970). Charity has been operating on a temporary license from the state for the past
two years. In Philadelphia and New Jersey, the shutting down of services at public hospitals because
of lack of funds has also resulted in litigation by the poor. Boone v. Tate, Civil No. 713 (C.P.
Phila. County). See HOSPITALS, May 16, 1971, at 24.
4. E.g., in New Orleans two private hospitals, Sara Mayo and Flint-Goodridge Hospital of
Dillard University, closed their "free or below cost" clinics in 1970. See Cook v. Ochsner
Foundation Hosp., 319 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La., 1970) (Answers to Interrogatories): the same
thing is happening all over the nation. See, Public Hospitals Live With Recession, Some May Die
of It, MODERN HOSPITAL, April, 1971, at 40-41, reporting that private hospitals in New York
and Houston are also curtailing or eliminating charity service.
This dual problem of the deterioration of the public hospital and closed doors of the private
hospital has been recognized by persons within the inner sanctum of the hospital field. Thus, in
the July 1970 issue of HOSPITALS, (which is the official publication of the American Hospital
Association), devoted to the plight of the public hospital, its feature editor states:
Whereas the 'mainstream' of health care during the 1950s and early 1960s was
progressive and represented by research-oriented medical centers, public hospitals
became the 'dumping grounds' for the medically indigent and had come to be identified
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of financing and delivery of health care have been, and continue to be, the
subject of intensive investigation by the two congressional committees (House
Ways and Means and Senate Finance) in which these subjects are merged for
consideration:
Apparently disregarding the severity of these health problems, the Internal
Revenue Service (IRS) thrust itself into the crisis by fashioning a tax policy
with deleterious implications for the health of the indigent. In October 1969,
IRS reversed its longstanding position that private hospital , if they wish to
retain tax-exempt status under the Internal Revenue Code must not deny
services to persons unable to pay.' This reversal of a longstanding definition
of "charitable," which had been reflected over the years in decisions of the
tax court and the federal courts, was issued while Congress was considering
and rejecting the feasibility of so amending the Internal Revenue Code.7 The
reversal of policy with regard to the obligation to serve the indigent as a
condition of tax exemption was in the form of a Revenue Ruling, a way least
likely to give opponents an opportunity to challenge the policy, on either a
legal or a policy basis. IRS thereby foreclosed consideration of the implications
of its ruling in the context of national health policy which the Senate Finance
Committee considered necessary for appropriate consideration of the subject.
with a dual standard of health care delivery. The passage of Medicare and Medicaid
legislation in the mid-1960s was expected to unify the dual system. Unfortunately, the
private sector has not absorbed its proportionate share of the sick poor.
HOSPITALS, July 1, 1970, at 54.
This problem of the private hospitals "dumping" patients onto the public hospitals has been
cited as one of the factors contributing to the crisis in public hospitals throughout the country.
As stated by the interns and residents suing Los Angeles County Hospital, "The root of the problem
. . . is the private hospitals in the county which transfer to County-USC all the patients who
are unwanted for one reason or another." Los Angeles Times, Jan. 13, 1970, at 3, col. 2. Across
the country, in the District of Columbia, a survey of patients by Georgetown University students
uncovered 30 cases of patients harmed by transfer from private hospitals to D.C. General. The
Washington Post, March 30, 1970, at I, col. 2.
5. These Committees not only consider tax policy and tax reform legislation, they also are
considering the operation of the Medicare and Medicaid system and the various proposals and
substitutes. See, e.g., STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 91ST CONG., IST SESS., MEDICARE
AND MEDICAID, PROBLEMS, ISSUES, AND ALTERNATIVES (Comm. Print 1970); Hearings on
Medicare and Medicaid Before the Subcomm. on Medicare-Medicaid of the Senate Comm. on
Finance, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2 (1970).
6. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 CUM. BULL. 117.
7. See H.R. CONE. REP. 782, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. 289-90 (1969).
8. S. REP. No. 552, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 61 (1969). The Senate Committee deleted the
amendment appearing in the House version of the bill which would have adopted the position of
Revenue Ruling 69-545, stating that "it decided to reexamine this matter in connection with
pending legislation on Medicare and Medicaid." Id. See also STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON
FINANCE, 91ST CONG., IST SESS., MEDICARE AND MEDICAID, PROBLEMS, ISSUES, AND
ALTERNATIVES 55-58 (Comm. Print 1970).
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The Revenue Ruling
The ruling issued by IRS in October 1969, provides in part:
In order for a hospital to establish that it is exempt as a public
charitable organization under § 501(c)(3) it must . ..be operated
for the care of all those persons in the community able to pay the
cost thereof either directly or through third party reimbursement,
9
This ruling expressly reversed a 1956 ruling, which interpreted the Internal
Revenue Code as requiring that hospitals must provide free patient care to
qualify for tax-exempt status. The earlier ruling specifically required that a
qualifying hospital:
Must be operated to the extent of its financial ability for those not
able to pay for the services rendered and not exclusively for those
who are able and expected to pay. It is normal for hospitals to
charge those able to pay for services rendered in order to meet the
operating expenses of the institution, without denying medical care
or treatment to others unable to pay. The fact that its charity record
is relatively low is not conclusive that a hospital is not operated
for charitable purposes to the full extent of its financial ability. It
may also set aside earnings which it uses for improvements and
additions to hospital facilities. It must not, however, refuse to accept
patients in need of hospital care who cannot pay for such services.
Furthermore, if it operates with the expectation of full payment
from all those who it renders services, it does not dispense charity
merely because some of its patients fail to pay for the services
rendered. ' 0
In sharp contrast with the 1969 ruling, the 1956 ruling did not reflect the
view that a hospital might totally exclude those unable to pay for services yet
confer a public, charitable benefit within the meaning of the Internal Revenue
Code. The "policy" described in the 1956 ruling did not originate at that time
with IRS; it had long been accepted by the Tax Court and federal courts which
considered the issue." Indeed, even its critics concede it was a longstanding
policy and the 1969 ruling constituted a "major revision." 2 Thus, in 1969 IRS
abandoned a well-recognized principle of federal tax law in a most informal
way, without congressional sanction, and in the face of congressional action
9. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 CUM. BULL. 117.
10. 1956-1 CUM. BULL. 202.
I1. See notes 57-70 and accompanying text infra.
12. Bromberg, The Charitable Hospital, 20 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 237 (1970).
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which expressed, at the very least, disagreement with the timing, if not the
substance, of the change.
The Role of the American Hospital Association
To understand the full implications of the IRS's actions, it is necessary to
review the events immediately preceding the Revenue Ruling, including the role
of the American Hospital Association (AHA) and the response of Congress
to its pleas.
In 1969 the American Hospital Association attempted to obtain tax-exempt
status and tax deduction eligibility for hospitals under Sections 501(c)(3) and
170 of the Internal Revenue Code, without regard to the amount of services
rendered to persons unable to pay. It sought to obtain such benefits by means
of amendments to the Internal Revenue Code. Witnesses appeared in support
of such propositions before the House Ways and Means Committee in February
1969.'1 AHA representatives advanced the proposition that the mere existence
of a nonprofit hospital facility whose purpose is the advancement of health is
charitable. 4 To support this, AHA argued that the amount of free care required
was uncertain, that universities, symphony orchestras, and jazz festivals
obtained tax-exempt status without regard to the relief of the poor, that the
1956 ruling and the Treasury regulations were inconsistent on the definition
of "charitable" issued under the 1954 Code, and that Scott on the law of
charities in trusts" supported the AHA proposed definition of "charitable"
for tax purposes.
Congressman Gibbons of Florida questioned the AHA spokesman about the
effect of removing the tax-exempt status requirement of service to the poor.
Despite their protestations that voluntary hospitals carried "a public trust,"
he voiced skepticism about future hospital beneficence if the coercive pressure
to serve the poor was removed.'I
No one testified on behalf of the poor, and no reference was made to the
inadequacies of the present dual system 7 in dealing with their hospital needs.
13. Hearings on the Tax Reform Act of 1969 (H.R. 13270) Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 4, at 1425 (1969).
14. Id. at 1428, 1433.
15. Id. See notes 31-37 and accompanying text infra for a refutation of AHA's position.
16. Id. at 1440-41.
17. The dual system of health care is that which places the indigent and medically indigent
into the public hospital system. It has been widely attacked for creating the quality-of-care crisis
for the poor. E.g., "A dual system of health care-one for the indigent, another for paying
patients-is indefensible as a concept and unacceptable as a practice. That view represented
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The House bill, as reported in August 1969, provided that "hospitals" be added
to the list of Section 501(c)(3) organizations and to the list of organizations
to which Section 170 contributions could be made, thus "freeing" hospitals
from the requirement of giving "charitable" services. The rationale for the
amendment in the House report was basically one proffered by the AHA-that
the present enforcement of the law "has resulted in significant uncertainty as
to the extent to which a hospital must accept patients who are unable to pay,
in order to retain its exempt status.""'
However, the House amendment was rejected by the Senate Finance
Committee and omitted from the bill passed by the Senate. Congress acceded
to the Senate on this question, and the final act (of December 1969) followed
the Senate version.' 9 The Report of the Staff of the Senate Committee on
Finance, issued in early 1970, exhibits a detailed history of the Senate deletion
of the House amendment.20 The Staff Report notes that the Committee on
Finance instructed it to summarize the major arguments for and against the
amendments in the House bill, and insofar as the hospital amendment was
concerned, it stated the following:
Arguments For.-B(l) These provisions are necessary to eliminate
challenges to the tax-exempt status of hospitals on the ground that
the hospitals are accepting insufficient numbers of patients at no
charge or at rates that are substantially below cost.
(2) By establishing hospitals as a separate exempt category and
removing the indefinite test of to what extent a hospital must serve
those who cannot pay, this bill removes the uncertainty surrounding
the hospital's continued ability to draw necessary support from the
public or from private foundations to accomplish its function.
(3) Hospitals perform a useful function of the sort that deserves
treatment in Section 501(c)(3) on the same basis as the other
organizations specifically named in that provision.
(4) The present environment of governmental assistance to permit
medical care to be made available to those otherwise unable to pay,
appears to make obsolete the need for hospitals themselves to
virtually the unanimous consensus of those who testified at hearings held by an Illinois State Senate
subcommittee created recently to investigate the plight of Cook County Hospital, Chicago."
HOSPITALS, May 1, 1970, at 107.
18. H.R. REP. No. 413, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 43 (1968).
19. H.R. CONF. REP. 782, 9 1 st Cong., I st Sess. 289-90 (1969).
20. STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 91ST CONG., IST SESS., MEDICARE AND
MEDICAID, PROBLEMS, ISSUES, AND ALTERNATIVES 55-58 (Comm. Print 1970).
[Vol. 21:35
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subsidize the providing of medical care to poor people. This is as
true regarding hospitals as it is regarding schools and churches.
Arguments Against.-(l) In order to be tax exempt hospitals
historically have been required to render service to the poor whether
or not there was an ability to pay for the services rendered. These
provisions would do away with that requirement and many marginal
income families that are now ineligible for payment of hospital care
under Medicaid, and who do not have sufficient resources to pay
for hospital treatment might be denied care now available to them.
This is especially true in States that do not pay for hospital care
of people who are eligible for general assistance under the welfare
programs of the State. The bill will pose particular hardships on
poor families priced out of hospital care by continually rising health
costs and this will put greater pressure on Congress to expand the
Medicaid program at the very time Congress is seeking to contract
and moderate it.
(2) To the extent hospitals contend Medicare and Medicaid does
not pay their full costs they would also contend that they are
providing charitable services for those patients. If the bill were not
changed these hospitals could refuse Medicare and Medicaid
patients with impunity or could limit their services to such patients
unless the Government met the hospitals' unilateral cost demands.
Without the balancing effect of the present Internal Revenue Service
position, government might be faced with the choice of either
complying with such payment ultimatums or seeing millions of poor
and aged citizens denied necessary care in community nonprofit
hospitals.
(3) There is no substantial evidence that contributors to hospitals
will decrease or stop their donations because the Internal Revenue
Service is questioning the tax-exempt status of a hospital (or
hospitals) on the ground that sufficient charitable services are not
being rendered to the poor.
(4) The extent of free and "below cost" hospital care has
diminished greatly with the advent of public programs such as
Medicare and Medicaid. The pressure to provide free care has
lessened to the extent that these multi-billion dollar programs and
private hospital insurance are now paying for many of those whose
bills previously went unpaid.
(5) The bill discards the charitable basis-the "community service
to all" concept-on which tax exemption of hospitals is founded.
19711
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(6) If there is a legitimate complaint that Internal Revenue rulings
are too vague on this point, a clarifying amendment establishing
statutory standards is the appropriate remedy rather than the
blanket approach of the House provision.
(7) Since the need for new legislative language has arisen because
of uncertainties in administration, then the resolution of such
uncertainties could be handled on an administrative basis.2'
The Staff Report noted AHA's representation in its testimony of October
28, 1969 at the Senate Finance Committee hearings on Medicare, that hospitals
recognize "the right to receive service regardless of the ability to pay is extended
to the entire community."21 In view of A HA's action in seeking the amendment
in the first place the report found this inexplicable23 and concluded that services
offered by hospitals that turned away the poor were not extended to the entire
community.2' it was recommended that the ruling be revoked,
until such time as Congress can devise an alternative approach
establishing reasonable yardsticks of charitable service related to the
financial capacity of a hospital. Such action . . .would assist in
protecting the availability of necessary hospital care to Medicare,
Medicaid, and other poor patients.
2 5
To date this ruling has not been revoked, and IRS apparently has continued
to grant tax-exempt status to hospitals without regard to policies of excluding
the poor. This action obviously has had the impact Congressman Gibbons
21. Id. at 55-56.
22. Id. at 57.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 58.
25. Id. In his article, Mr. Bromberg notes that this recommendation leaves the issue still in
dispute. Bromberg, The Charitable Hospital, 20 CATHOLIC U.L. REV. 237 (1970). The AHA
apparently is aware of the questionable status of the ruling, since it continues to seek congressional
approval. Testimony in support of its proposition of "tax-exemption-without-regard-to-free-
service" was offered in the Senate hearings. Hearings on Medicare and Medicaid before the
Subcomm. on Medicare-Medicaid of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 9 1 st Cong., 2d Sess. 374-77
(1970). Senator Ribicoff strongly rejected the proposition, stating,
I think there is something abhorent in the thought that there is a community hospital
that holds itself out to take care of the health needs of the people, and yet would feel
free to turn away a sick person who needs care on the basis that they cannot pay for
it. Now, I tell you, as far as I am concerned, I would not accept what you are saying
under any circumstances. Maybe others in the Senate would, but I would not.
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feared. In New Orleans two hospitals which prior to 1970 claimed they had
"free or below cost" clinics closed those operations in early 1970. Reportedly
the same is occurring throughout the country."
The Legal and Social Infirmities of the New Revenue Ruling
In light of the legislative history of the tax-exempt provisions, including recent
events and the longstanding interpretation of those provisions by the Tax Court
and the federal courts, the 1969 ruling is clearly an ultra vires action on the
part of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue. The ruling "legislated" a
critical change in tax policy without appropriate authority. Even if one assumes
arguendo that the Commissioner has the power to "reinterpret" the tax law
in this way, doing so by means of an interpretive bulletin illegally circumvents
the requirements of the Administrative Procedures Act.2Y Most importantly,
this tax policy operates as unwise health policy by perpetuating and enlarging
the gulf between the health care available to the rich and that available to the
poor when government and private organizations are working toward the
elimination of this dual system."
An Erroneous Application of Legal Principles
An institution may be deemed "charitable" for at least three purposes, each
26. See note 4 supra.
27. 5 U.S.C. § 500 (1964).
28. Written into both the Medicare and Medicaid systems is the philosophy that the poor should
be able to obtain health care from the same providers as do the rich. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1395a, 1396a
(a)(23) (Supp. V, 1970). Ironically, even the opponents of major health programs have opposed
them for the stated reason of fear of treating the needy "differently." During the hearings on
Medicare and Medicaid in 1965, the California Medical Association stated, "It is important that
the patient stay in the mainstream of medical care in his community. He should be subject to no
discrimination or segregation from other citizens who are able to provide for their own care. He
should be able to use the same facilities." See Hearings on H.R. 6675 Before Senate Comm. on
Finance, 89th Cong., Ist Sess. 656 (1965). The necessary effect of the IRS ruling is to cast the
poor back upon the public hospital system. The "dumping" of indigent patients by private
charitable hospitals onto the municipal or county hospitals is a common and widely acknowledged
practice. See note 4 supra.
That "dumping" is a problem has been acknowledged by the Joint Commission on Accreditation
of Hospitals, a prestigious voluntary organization composed of representatives of the AMA, AHA,
American College of Physicians, and American College of Surgeons. In its recently adopted
Standards for Hospital Accreditation, the Joint Commission requires that each person who
presents himself at a hospital emergency room must be at least appraised and diagnosed. Moreover
transfers of patients cannot be made until such time as medical records are complete and only
with the consent of the transferee institution. This latter provision was added to the Standards at
the request of groups representing poor persons who were concerned about the "dumping"
syndrome.
19711
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involving unique legal principles and rationales. Regarding the law of trusts
one evaluates whether property may be dedicated to a specific use in perpetuity
(a "charitable" use). In the law of torts one evaluates where certain institu-
tions may be immunized from individual suits based on injuries committed
by the institutions ("charitable" immunity).,9 In the law of taxation one
evaluates the consequences of releasing an institution from its normal share
of the costs of government (exemption from tax, as a "charitable" institu-
tion).
When the Commissioner reconsidered the requirements for a hospital's
eligibility for tax exemption he cited Scott on Trusts and the Restatement of
Trusts (of which Professor Scott is the principal reporter) as sole authority
for the proposition that,
[t]he promotion of health ... is one of the purposes in the general
law of charity that is deemed beneficial to the community as a whole
even though the class of beneficiaries eligible to receive a direct
benefit does not include all members of the community such as
indigent members of the community, provided that the class is not
so small that its relief is not of benefit to the community.
3 0
Scott's characterization, of course, applied to the law of trusts." It does not
automatically apply to the policies underlying the grant of a tax exemption.
29. Bpsed on a theory that tort liability could obliterate the assets of the institution, historically
certain charitable institutions were given immunity from suit. In recent days, however, insurance
has been looked upon as a more viable and just substitute, and this immunity from suits has almost
disappeared from the law as it pertains to charitable hospitals. It is not relevant to our discussion
herein, and will not be further discussed.
30. Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 CUM. BULL. 117.
31. Even for the law of trusts, however, the law is not settled in that a hospital, is "charitable"
without regard to free services to the poor. As stated in Trust Co. of Georgia v. Williams, 184
Ga. 460, 462, 192 S.E. 913, 914 (1937): "A hospital, however, is not any more than a drugstore,
a charitable institution per se; and, in order for a devise or other gift establishing a hospital to
come within the classification of a charitable institution, the terms of the gift must themselves
require that it be operated in whole or at least in substantial part for the gratuitous relief of its
inmates."
It is not altogether clear how Scott came to his conclusion; many of the cases he cites in his
long footnote actually spell out the requirement that the poor as well as the rich be treated in
charitable hospitals. E.g., Hart v. Taylor, 301 III. 344, 133 N.E. 857, 858 (1922); O'Brien v.
Physicians' Hosp. Ass'n, 96 Ohio St. I, 116 N.E. 975, 977 (1917). They rather support the
proposition that health is a purpose which may be charitable, provided that actual charity is
bestowed. This is fully in keeping with the pre-1969 position of the IRS. As stated in Sonora
Community Hosp., 46 T.C. 519, 525-26 (1966), "The mere fact that petitioner maintained a
hospital does not in and of itself justify the conclusion that it was operated exclusively for charitable
purposes. While the diagnosis and cure of diseases are indeed purposes that may furnish the
foundation for characterizing an activity as 'charitable,' something more is required." See Rev.
Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 CUM. BULL. 202.
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In discussing the reasons for classifying trusts as "charitable" thus
nondestructible under the rule against perpetuities, Scott states:
In classifying the purposes which are held to be charitable, it is
possible to enumerate some of them, as has been done in the
preceding sections. But no matter how many types of purposes are
thus enumerated, there will always be another class to include the
miscellaneous purposes which cannot be classified under a single
heading. The common element is that the purposes are of a character
sufficiently beneficial to justify permitting property to be devoted
for an indefinite time to their accomplishment.
2
The determination that a purpose is "sufficiently beneficial" tips the scale in
favor of control by the "dead hand of the past" to the detriment of the deceased
ancestor's disinherited heirs.
Granting tax-exempt status to a charity, however, does not involve the same
considerations as evaluating the claims of private persons to the property of
their ancestor. Rather it results from legislative balancing of two competing
public interests-that everyone pays his share of the costs of government, 3 and
The concept of charitable trusts emerges from the Statutes of Elizabeth I, and the relief of "aged
impotent and poor people" set forth therein. This provision was part of the Elizabethan poor
laws, and implicit throughout was the concept of assistance to the poor. As set forth in TenBroek,
California's Dual System of Family Law: Its Origin, Development, and Present Status, 16 STAN.
L. REV. 257, 267 (1964):
Under the Tudors charitable foundations and the law of charitable trusts were developed
in connection with the poor law. As the state assumed public responsibility for the poor,
it built upon private charity and sought to encourage it. At best, such charity was an
alternative to public expenditure; at least, it served as a method of reducing the cost.
As the poor law system evolved, the Tudors sought to assure that charitable foundations
devoted their resources without diversion or misapplication, that private and public
charitable works were interrelated administratively, and the establishment of private
charitable foundations occurred, especially in the area covered by the public responsi-
bility. While we cannot ignore pressures arising from the political changes of the times
and the developing parens patriae and police functions of the state, it is probably not
too much to say that the modern law of charitable trusts evolved as an integral part of
the poor law system and did so primarily because of the assumption of public responsi-
bility by that system, with the resulting necessity of finding means of keeping down public
expenditures.
The Statute was a product of the realization that laws against vagrancy and begging would
not work if men were hungry, and the enlightenment when "the eminent statesmen of Elizabeth's
reign courageously determined to act upon the principle that the relief of destitution must be
undertaken as a public duty, and be provided for at the public charge, in order to ensure the due
ascendancy of the law; and this principle was finally established by the passing of the 43rd
Elizabeth." G. NICHOLS, A HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH POOR LAW 194 (rev. ed. 1967).
32. 4 A. SCOTT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS § 372.1 (3d ed. 1967) (emphasis supplied).
33. "Based on the theory that all property should bear its proportionate share of the costs
of government and property be absolved from such obligation only for good cause, taxation is
19711
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that since the government must perform certain functions if private parties do
not, the use of tax incentives to subsidize such work by private parties lessens
the burdens of government.3" Not all purposes which are "sufficiently
beneficial" for trust purposes, commensurately lessen the burdens of
government for tax purposes. Neither the absence of a profit motive3 nor the
accumulation of income for future charitable uses is enough. 36 In Erie
Endowment v. United States the Third Circuit held that the unreasonable
accumulation of income deprived a charitable foundation of tax-exempt status.
The court states:
It has no natural right to tax exemption, but rather a Congressional
balm granted because losses in tax revenue were deemed compen-
sated for by the value of charitable work. Absent a sufficient amount
of charitable work commensurate with the total amount of Erie's
available funds, exempt status must cease, or in fact, never come
into existence.
37
The Intention -of Congress: the Legislative History of Charitable Tax Status
of Hospitals
The Internal Revenue Code does not presently contain, nor has it ever
contained, specific exemptions for hospitals as a class. To be eligible for tax-
exempt status under federal law, hospitals always have had to qualify under
the classification "charitable." The legislative history of the charitable tax
exemption and deduction provisions establishes that Congress never intended
those provisions to apply to hospitals solely because of their nonprofit dedica-
tion to health if only persons able to pay were to be served and persons unable
to pay could be turned away.
The present provision bestowing tax-exempt status provides in part:
An organization described in subsection (c) . . . shall be exempt
the rule and exemption the exception." Cleveland Osteopathic Hosp. v. Zangerle, 153 Ohio 222,
223, 91 N.E.2d 261, 263 (1950). "The fundamental approach of our statutes is that ordinarily
all property shall bear its just and equal share of the public burden of taxation. As the existence
of government is a necessity, taxes are demanded and received in order for government to function."
Presbyterian Homes v. Division of Tax Appeals, 55 N.J. 275, 279, 261 A.2d 143, 147 (1970).
34. This "lessening the burdens of government" theory underlies the charitable exemption
history. See H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 19-20 (1939). It appears in the current
IRS regulations defining "'charitable." Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)-I(d)(2) (970).
35. "[P]rofit is a factor for consideration, but is not necessarily controlling since nonprofit
status 'cannot be equated with charitableness .... '" Catholic Charities v. City of Pleasantville,
109 N.J. Super. 475, 263 A.2d 803 (1970).
36. Erie Endowment v. United States, 316 F.2d 151 (3d Cir. 1963).
37. Id. at 153.
[Vol. 21:35
Health Problems of the Poor
from taxation . . . (c) The following organizations are referred to
in subsection (a) . . (3) Corporation, and community chest, fund,
or foundation, organized and operated exclusively for religious,
charitable, scientific, testing for public safety, literary, or
educational purposes, or for the prevention of cruelty to children
or animals, no part of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit
of any private shareholder or individual .... 1s
Absent such qualification hospitals must pay taxes just like any other "busi-
ness." 9 Further, they cannot be tax-deductible beneficiaries of the largess of
other individual or corporate taxpayers seeking to channel otherwise taxable
income to private institutions. 5 In this latter respect the Code provides:
There shall be allowed as a deduction any charitable contribution
(as defined in subsection (c)) . . . (c) For purposes of this section,
the term "charitable contribution" means a contribution or gift to
or for the use of- . . . (2) a corporation, trust, or community chest,
fund, or foundation- . . . (B) organized and operated exclusively
for religious, charitable, scientific, literary, or educational purposes
or for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals; (c) no part
of the net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual; .... 11
Moreover, if the hospital qualifies as a "charitable" entity under Section
170 it becomes a member of a special category of institutions to which a
taxpayer may contribute amounts totaling up to 50 percent of his income;
38. INT. REV. CODE of 1954 §§ 501(a) and 501(c)(3) (Supp. V, 1970). [Hereinafter cited as
IPC].
39. In addition to federal income taxes, hospitals which are not tax exempt are subject to state
income taxes, county and municipal property taxes, business taxes, payroll taxes (including SSA,
unemployment), sales taxes, and state franchise taxes. The amount of these taxes can be
considerable. In a report by an association of proprietary hospitals to the California'State Agency
for Health Planning, there is stated that eight such hospitals, ranging in size from 53 to 180 beds,
paid some $2,356,432 in taxes in fiscal 1969. Extrapolating these figures to cover the nearly 14,000
proprietary beds in California would amount to some $41,276,000 paid in taxes. See Weissburg,
Factors for Consideration in Determining Bed Need of Hospitals, UNITED Hosps. Ass'N, July
30, 1970.
40. Such donations can be considerable. For example, in fiscal year 1969, some $22.5 billion
was spent for hospital care in the United States, and an additional $2.5 billion was spent for
construction and modernization of health care facilities. Approximately 51 percent of the $25
billion total came from the private sector, with philanthropy providing $2.3 billion of that 51
percent. Of particular significance is the fact that of the $2.3 billion from charity, $1.5 billion
was for construction or modernization of facilities (or 60 percent of the $2.5 billion spent for
construction). See Hearings on Medicare and Medicaid before the Subcomm. on Medicare-
Medicaid of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 422 (1969). It is also obvious
that tax-deductible status encouraged donors to give to institutions which quality. See Hearings
Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., Ist Sess. 1475 (1969) (Statement of
Ass'n of Independent Colleges). Cf Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp. 1127, 1134-5 (D.D.C. 1970).
41. IRC §§ 170(a), (c)(1964).
19711
Catholic University Law Review
whereas gifts to charitable institutions not so favored may be deducted only
to the extent that they do not exceed 20 percent of the taxpayer's income."2
These provisions originated in the first federal income tax statute in 1894
which was declared unconstitutional before any of its provisions were inter-
preted. Section 32 of the Act of August 27, 1894, exempted from taxation,
Corporations, companies, or associations organized and conducted
solely for charitable, religious, or educational purposes, including
fraternal beneficiary societies, orders, or associations operating
upon the lodge system and providing for the payment of life, sick,
accident, and other benefits to the members of such societies, orders,
or associations and dependents of such members . . .3
Legislative history explaining inclusions or exclusions is scanty. However, the
existence of hospitals as a separate exempt classification (apart from "chari-
table") would not have been unprecedented; and such classification could have
appeared if the spokesmen for the legislation so desired.
William Jennings Bryan of Nebraska, one of the spokesmen for the bill,
introduced into the record information on the income tax in other countries.
He found that in England, "there are exemptions extending to charities,
universities, friendly, industrial, and provident societies, hospitals, etc ....
A separate exemption for hospitals could also have been found under the laws
of certain states. In New York, for example, hospitals were an "exempt"
classification, provided they rendered medical care "to poor persons in need
of such treatment without charge." 4 5
The same exemptions with respect to corporations or associations organized
for "religious, charitable, or educational purposes" were carried into the
corporation excise tax law of 1909, and the income tax of 1913.41 To the latter,
the "line" progenitor of the present law, the classification "scientific" was
added. The restrictive interpretation given to exemption eligibility can be seen
in some remarks supporting this addition and a provision for "benevolent"
organizations which was not adopted:
Mr. Rogers . .. The words which I have caused to be added
will make an exemption in favor not only of religious, charitable,
42. Id.
43. Law of August 27, 1894, § 32,28 Stat. 509.
44. 26 CONG. REC. 584, 586 (1894).
45. Section 4 of the Laws of 1889, Chapter 95 so provided. Subsequently, Section 4, subdivision
6, of the Tax Law of 1896, chapter 908, exempted a list of organizations, including hospitals and
infirmaries, without mention of service to persons unable to pay. In 1907, the 1896 law was
interpreted as superceding the earlier law, and in 1944 it was said to have deleted the service to
the poor requirement. See People v. Sexton, 267 App. Div. 736, 48 N.Y.S.2d 201 (1944).
46. Law of August 5, 1909, § 38, 36 Stat. I1; Law of October 3, 1913, § I I(G)(a), 38 Stat.
114.
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or education corporations, . . . but also in favor of benevolent or
scientific corporations. In this connection I should like to refer to
the language of the Massachusetts statute in this regard, which
exempts from taxation literary, educational, benevolent, charitable,
scientific, or religious corporations. Three of the six exemptions
along this line which the Massachusetts law includes are already
in the act as. reported, namely, educational charitable, or religious
corporations. I have not included in my amendment the word
"literary," although I think there is much to be said for that
inclusion also. But I do think that there can be no sound objection
to the inclusion of the words "benevolent" and "scientific." It
might be suggested by some that "benevolent" is synonymous with
"charitable," and that therefore it is already sufficiently covered
by the terms of the act as it has been introduced. But it has been
held in Massachusetts that a corporation may be "charitable,"
within the meaning of the Statute, without being "benevolent," and
that it may be "benevolent" without being "charitable." Therefore,
in view of the undoubted fact, as I conceive it, that we ought to
care not merely for charitable corporations, but also for benevolent
corporations, it seems to me clear that this word should be added,
so as to do no injustice to the latter class of institutions. As to the
inclusion of the word "scientific," I have no especial need, I think,
to dwell upon the propriety of that amendment. The great
institutions in this country engaged in scientific research-with no
purpose of gain or emolument to the institution as a whole or to
the members who are concerned therein--certainly ought to be
treated on the same basis as religious, charitable, or educational
corporations. 7
At this important juncture in the development of the tax statute, the
draftsmen were carefully circumscribing the purposes and objects for
exemption, and adopting narrow rather than broad classifications. Arguably,
the term "charitable" could be as broad as "benevolent" and the term
"educational" can include "scientific" and "literary." Nevertheless, Congress
chose to restrict exemption to more narrowly defined purposes. In England
the concept of "charity" had developed to include "trusts for other purposes
beneficial to the community, not falling under any of the preceding heads"
in addition to trusts for the relief of poverty, advancement of education, and
advancement of religion." s However broadly or narrowly the "beneficial
purposes" classification may be viewed by English trust law," for purposes
47. 50 CONG. REC., 1305-06 (1913).
48. Commissioners v. Pemsel [1891] A.C. 531, 583; See also Brunyate, The Legal Definition
of Charity, 61 L.Q. REV. 268, 269 (1945).
49. It is thus, in this context, not relevant whether England has come to read the words "aged,
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of tax exemption under the Internal Revenue Code it would appear to include
only those objects which Congress intended to be included. For example, while
"prevention of cruelty to animals" appears to be included under this
"beneficial purposes" heading in England, 50 it is included under the Internal
Revenue Code only because the Code was amended in 1918 to include
organizations "for the prevention of cruelty to children or animals." 51
In 1924 Senator Willis of Ohio proposed to add parenthetical language after
"charitable" so as to include "preventive and constructive service for relief,
rehabilitation, health, character building, and citizenship." 52 He explained his
amendment thusly:
The present Commissioner of Internal Revenue has decided that
under the existing law an allowance can not be made for gifts to a
community chest unless those gifts shall be for the relief of the poor.
That is a rather recent decision to which the attention of Senators
may not have been drawn. It was made on the 8th of October, 1923,
and is found in volume 2 of the Decisions of the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue. Under that decision he holds that gifts to financial
federations doing welfare work and social service other than relief
to the poor would not be among the allowable deductions. It is to
be noted that the decision is exactly contary to a decision made by
his predecessor, who held that deductions could be made for such
gifts .. . .
It seems to me, Mr. President, the law ought not require that gifts
shall be used only to alleviate poverty. It ought to be permissible
to use them so, if possible, as to prevent poverty. 5
Other Senators disagreed with the suggestions of Senator Willis, indicating that
the terms he suggested were too elastic, and that Congress had gone as far as
it should go in tinkering with the revenues of government.54 The amendment
was withdrawn after it became clear that the sentiment of the Senate was
against the broad sweep of the parenthetical language. No modification or
change was made in the tax exemption and deduction provisions to indicate
any departure from the Commissioner's "relief of the poor" concept of
impotent and poor" as those terms appear from the ancient Statute of Charitable Uses in the
disjunctive rather than conjunctive, as suggested by Bromberg, The Charitable Hospital, 20
CATHOLIC U.L. REV. at 240-41 (1970).
50. Brunyate, The Legal Definition of Charity, 61 L.Q. REV., at 276-77 (1945).
51. Int. Rev. Act of 1921, § 231, 42 Stat. 227 (now INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)(3))
which also added "literary" to the classifications covered by the present tax exemption.
52. 65 CONG. REC. 8171 (1924).
53. Id.
54. Id. at 8172-73.
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"charitable. '5 Thus failed the only attempt, prior to 1969, to specify health
per se as a tax exempt purpose.
While other subsections have been added to the overall provisions dealing
with tax exemptions for very specifically described organizations, since 1924
the only addition to Subsection 501(c) and its predecessors has been the
inclusion of organizations operated for the purpose of "testing for public
safety."51
The Judicial Interpretation of the Application of "'Charitable" to Hospitals
Under the Internal Revenue Code.
Judicial construction of the requirements essential for hospitals to attain
charitable status under the Code appears to begin with Commissioner v. Battle
Creek Sanitarium, 7 the leading case on the subject. The sanitarium had
maintained a regular schedule of rates, which were charged to patients able
to pay; those unable to pay full rates paid nothing or a fraction of the regular
charge. From 1930 to 1935, 926 day patients paid the full charges, 145 paid
fractional charges, and 705 paid nothing; 515 home patients paid full charges,
533 paid part, and ten paid nothing. The court set forth the premise for finding
such an institution qualified for charitable exempt status:
55. In that ruling the Commissioner, after noting that "in dealing with charitable trusts or
uses the courts have tended to give a very broad meaning to the term 'charitable,' on the ground
that it was expedient to uphold such trusts or uses," stated that charitable for internal revenue
purposes was more restrictive, i.e., used "in its popular and ordinary sense [which] pertains to
the relief of the poor." INT. REV. BULL. 11-1-2 (1923), Ruling 11-2-1128 I.T. 1800, 152, 153.
56. This provision was added to the new INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 501(c)(3). See U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS, 83rd Cong., 2d Sess., 4950 (1965). No comparable provision was added to
the tax deduction definition of "charitable" in § 170(c).
57. 126 F.2d 405 (5th Cir. 1942). The issue does not appear to have arisen earlier. This is
probably due to a number of factors, including the fact that prior to World War I the hospital
was not the center of the medical universe which it has thereafter become. After the War the
combination of the increased use of hospitals because of multiple breakthroughs in sophisticated
medical techniques and the inflationary pressure of the economy have increased the cost of charity
care. In 1946, when Congress passed the Hospital Survey and Construction Act, known popularly
as Hill-Burton, the traditional notion of charity care, meaning free and below-cost services to the
indigent and medically indigent, was therein reflected. 42 U.S.C. § 291 c(e) (1964). No hospital
has ever received a Hill-Burton grant without making the commitment to afford a reasonable
volume of services to persons unable to pay. See Rose, Hospital Admission of the Poor and the
Hill-Burton Act, 3 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 185 (1969); Rose, The Duty of Publicly-Funded Hospitals
to Provide Services to the Medically Indigent, 3 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 254 (1969). Nonprofit
facilities, most especially hospitals, are eligible to receive such moneys, and it appears that IRS's
determination under IRC § 501(c)(3) (1964) is used as proof of "nonprofit status." As of
June 30, 1968, some 5,128 nonprofit projects had received such moneys. These projects furnish
some 261,760 beds or 59.1 percent of the beds so funded and have received some 58.1 percent of
federal Hill-Burton funds. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND
WELFARE, FACTS ABOUT THE HILL-BURTON PROGRAM, JULY I, 1947-JUNE 30, 1968 (1968).
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It is also usual for hospitals and sanitariums to charge those able
to pay for services rendered, in order to pay the expenses of the
institution, while not denying treatment to others unable to pay
anything. Such institutions are classed as charitable.
5
For the following 27 years this remained the basic rule for all federal tax
exemption provisions relating to. hospitals, until the 1969 ruling eliminated the
requirement that in order to qualify institutions must not deny treatment to
persons unable to pay.
In Intercity Hospital Association v. Squire,59 the IRS denied charitable tax
status, resting its conclusion upon the dual findings that, "in practically every
case a charge is made for the services rendered" and "neither your articles
of incorporation nor by-laws provide for the treatment of charitable patients,
and it is apparent from the evidence presented that you have no purpose and
made no pretense of bestowing charity. ' ' " The district court held that these
findings were unsubstantiated, and found rather that the evidence established
"no questions whatever were asked and no statement required of financial
standing nor ability to pay immediately or prospectively . . .an amount
ranging from six to eight percent of such gross income was donated to charity
patients."'"
The Tax Court issued similar opinions during that same period. Thus, in
Davis Hospital, 2 it deemphasized the stress the Commissioner had placed upon
the fact that the hospital charged those able to pay for the services rendered,
citing Battle Creek for the proposition that, "This is the usual practice of
hospitals. So long as admission and treatment are not denied to those unable
to pay, an institution is classed as charitable.."63 In Goldsby King Memorial,
4
the Tax Court quoted Battle Creek for the same proposition. This was the state
of the law which the Revenue Service codified in 1956 when it issued Revenue
Ruling 56-185 requiring that tax-exempt hospitals in order to retain their tax-
exempt status must accept persons in need of hospital services but unable to
pay.
The same approach was followed by the Tax Court subsequent to the ruling.
In 1958 it denied tax-exempt status in Lorain Avenue Clinic,6 5 but granted it
in Robert C. Olney." In Olney the two cases were compared. The court stated
58. Id. at 406.
59. 56 F. Supp. 472 (W.D. Wash. 1944).
60. Id. at 474.
61. Id.
62. 4CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 312 (1945).
63. Id. at 315.
64. 3 CCH Tax Ct. Mem 693 (1944).
65. 31 T.C. 141 (1958).
66. 17 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 982 (1958).
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that in Lorain Avenue Clinic, "charitable services as were rendered . . . were
occasional and of too minor volume to qualify petitioner for exemption [where]
in the instant case . . . the hospital has numerous charity patients and was
operated on a charitable basis to the extent of its financial ability."67 Again
in John J. Cranley, Jr.,6" the Tax Court rejected a claim of charitable exemption
due to the absence of any evidence as to "how many patients, if any, paid
reduced or nominal charges or no charge at all" during the five year period
in question. In Sonora Community Hospital"9 in 1966 the Tax Court continued
to reiterate this same theme: "The amount of free care as rendered by petitioner
was on a de minimus level, being less than I percent of paid care . . . a
,charitable' hospital may impose charges or fees for services rendered, and
indeed, its charity record may be comparatively low . . . but a serious question
is raised where its charitable operation is virtually inconsequential."'7 ,
The Commissioner Lacks the Legal Authority to Promulgate this Ruling.
Although the Secretary of the Treasury, and through him the Commissioner,
has authority to promulgate regulations for the enforcement of the Internal
Revenue Laws7" he does not have the authority to amend the Code by either
regulation or interpretive bulletin. In Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Commis-
sioner,7 2 the Supreme Court admonished the Commissioner thusly:
Over the same extended period of years during which the foregoing
administrative and judicial precedent was accumulating, Congress
repeatedly re-enacted the depreciation provision without significant
change. Thus, beyond the generally understood scope of the
depreciation provision itself, the Commissioner's long-standing and
consistent administrative practice must be deemed to have received
congressional approval.
In light of the legislative history, the longstanding judicial and administrative
construction of the Code (in which Congress over the years acquiesced), and
67. Id. at 993.
68. 20 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 20 (1961).
69. 46 T.C. 519 (1966).
70. Id. at 526 (emphasis supplied).
71. See IRC § 7805 (Supp. V, 1970).
72. 383 U.S. 272, 283 (1965). Accord United States v. Leslie Salt Co., 350 U.S. 383, 396-97
(1955):
Against the Treasury's prior longstanding and consistent administrative interpretation
its more recent ad hoc contention as to how the statute should be construed cannot
stand. Moreover, the original interpretation has had both express and implied
congressional acquiescence, through the 1918 amendment to the statute . . . which has
ever since continued in effect, and through Congress having let the administrative
interpretation remain undisturbed for so many years. [Citations omitted].
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the recent action of Congress in rejecting amendment to the Code and holding
legislative resolution of the issue in abeyance until it could be considered in
the context of health policy, the Commissioner without appropriate authority,
in effect "legislated" an amendment to Section 501(c)(3) to include hospitals
as a separate classification.7"
Further, assuming that the Commissioner had the power to reinterpret the
tax law as he did, his method of doing so by means of an interpretive bulletin
illegally circumvented the Administrative Procedures Act (APA). The APA
sets forth specific requirements to be followed by an agency in promulgating
substantive rules. Among them is a mandate that general notice of proposed
rule making must be announced in the Federal Register and an opportunity
must be presented for interested persons to participate through the submission
of written data, views and arguments.7" That statutory provision does exclude
from its requirements so-called "interpretive rules." In Gibson Wine Co. v.
Snyder,75 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia distinguished
between rules which must proceed under the requirements of Section 553 and
interpretive rules: "Generally speaking, it seems to be established that
'regulations,' 'substantive rules' or 'legislative rules' are those which create law,
usually implementary to an existing law; whereas interpretative rules are
statements as to what the administrative officer thinks the statute or reglation
means. '71 The court in Gibson split in applying these principles to the facts;
the majority finding the action of IRS "interpretative." However, in the instant
case, where even proponents of the ruling admit that the opposite position has
been longstanding, and that the change is a "major revision,"17 the ruling can
hardly qualify as merely interpretive. Moreover the major policy implications
of the revision necessitate precisely the kind of forum and opportunity for
exchange of views contemplated by the APA in its requirements for agency
rule-making procedures. It would be anomalous, indeed, to label such an
important policy change merely interpretive, thereby depriving interested
persons of the opportunity to express their views.
The Policy Considerations for Requiring Private Hospitals to Give Services
to Persons Unable to Pay.
Although the critics of the "relief of the poor" requirement acknowledge that
73. The Commissioner acted while the matter was pending in Congress, after the House had
approved the AHA proposal and before the Senate rejected it. Although the issue might have been
"moot" had the proposal been adopted, the final action would appear to require IRS to revoke
the Ruling, which it has not done.
74. See 5 U.S.C. § 553 (Supp. V, 1970).
75. 194 F.2d 329 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
76. Id. at 331.
77. Bromberg, The Charitable Hospital, 20 CATHOLIC U.L. REv. 237 (1970).
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hospitals have always been required to serve persons unable to pay in order
to qualify for federal tax exemption and deduction status, they claim that the
perpetuation of this policy is "archaic" and that nonprofit hospitals confer a
"community benefit" regardless of policies of nonadmission of persons unable
to pay."8
In The Charitable Hospital, Mr. Bromberg characterizes his position as an
"existential community benefit" approach, in which the public and the large
teaching hospitals bear the brunt of service of the poor while "other hospitals
are responsive to the needs of the middle and more affluent classes."7 This
characterization merely begs the question-whether a hospital which denies
service to those members of the community who are unable to pay is conferring
a community benefit within the meaning of the Internal Revenue Code.
This "community-benefit-sans-service-to-the-poor" approach ignores the
underlying rationale for the granting of tax-exempt status to charities as well
as the tax deductible status accorded to donations made to them.
The exemption from taxation of money or property devoted to
charitable and other purposes is based upon the theory that the
Government is compensated for the loss of revenue by its relief
from financial burden which would otherwise have to be met by
appropriations from public funds, and by the benefits resulting from
the promotion of the general welfare.w
If private hospitals treat only paying patients, the burden to be borne by the
federal government increases. This is not a theoretical statement, but the reality
of a crisis which even the AHA acknowledged by devoting its July 1, 1970
issue to the subject.8 ' At the very time when government is most pressed by a
financial squeeze on health services, when municipal hospitals are closing
services and operating at dericits, when poor people are being turned away from
the inadequate services at the public hospital and are denied access into the
private sector because of lack of money and health insurance, 2 when state
78. Id. See also Hearings Before the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 91st Cong., Ist Sess.,
pt. 4, at 1425 (1969) (testimony of AHA).
79. It should be noted with reference to "large teaching hospitals" that where these are not
public hospitals the poor are admitted only if they offer "interesting" teaching material. The value
of such institutions to the health status of the ordinary poor, sick person is questionable.
80. H.R. REP. No. 1860, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1939).
81. HOSPITALS July I, 1970.
82. When the poor Finally get into hospitals they are sicker than the middle class. Inadequate
hospital facilities must treat the sicker patients, and thus the less sick are turned away until the
progression of their illness "qualifies" them for treatment, often too late. In Cook v. Ochsner
Foundation Hospital, 319 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1970), two would-be plaintiffs, one whose name
was on the draft complaint as the first-styled plaintiff, died before the lawsuit could be brought.
Both had been rejected for admission into the overcrowded public hospital several times over the
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governments are cutting back on coverage and eligibility for Medicaid' 3 to cast
upon the government the entire burden of caring for the poor simply cannot
be a "lessening of the burdens of government." As cogently stated by the
Illinois court which in denying tax-exempt status to an old people's home which
reserved the right to discharge a resident who became sick, unmanageable, or
depleted his assets, and then to cast him upon the state for care, went on to
say: "The State would be bereft of any asset or estate from which it might
seek reimbursement for its outlay after the person's demise. We can only infer
that plaintiff's use of its property in this respect could tend to increase rather
than lessen, the State's burden."8 4
Congressional policy in the health area has become increasingly concerned
with affording hospital service to persons unable to pay. The Hill-Burton Act
reflects the traditional notion that hospitals receiving such public grant-in-aid
funds afford a reasonable volume of service to persons unable to pay."s
Recently, a federal court has held that poor people are a special beneficiary
prior few weeks before death, and also had been rejected by private, nonprofit, tax-exempt hospitals
in metropolitan New Orleans because of lack of money. One died in the public hospital, an hour
after being finally admitted. The other died in one of the private hospitals, to which he had been
admitted after his brother borrowed $200, the price of admission, some six weeks after a physician
on the staff of that hospital had noted after examining him that he should be admitted into a
hospital but did not have the money for admission into that hospital. See Cook, supra Complaint
and Answers to Interrogatories. These are the realities of the health problems of the poor.
83. Morris v. Williams, 63 Cal. Reptr. 689, 433 P.2d 697; C.M.A. v. Brian, Civil No. 208390-
209168 (Sup. Ct., Sacramento County, 1971); Catholic Medical Center v. Rockefeller, 305 F. Supp.
1256 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), affd, 430 F.2d 1297 (2d Cir. 1970). Indeed, the National Governor's
Conference opposed the House Amendment granting hospitals tax-exempt status without regard
to service to the poor because of its cost implication under the Medicaid program, and the greater
financial burden which would thereby be imposed on both state and federal government. See Letter
from Charles A. Byrley, Nat'l Governors' Conf. to Senator Russell B. Long, Oct. 27, 1969, in
STAFF OF THE SENATE COMM. ON FINANCE, 91ST CONG., IST SESS., REPORT ON MEDICARE AND
MEDICAID, PROBLEMS, ISSUES, AND ALTERNATIVES (Comm. Print 1970).
84. Methodist Old People Home v. Korzen, 39 111.2d 149, 155, 233 N.E.2d 537, 543 (1968).
Other states hgree. Thus, in Ruston Hosp. v. Riser, 191 So.2d 664 (La. 1966), the Louisiana
court, noting that the institution did not admit charity patients and scheduled charges even for
welfare patients, stated, "there is no basis for the contention that plaintiffs operation in any degree
whatsoever served to relieve the State or its governmental subdivision of the burden of caring for
the sick and indigent." Likewise the New Jersey courts hate recognized that the failure to care
for the aged poor by private homes, casts a financial burden on the state. See Presbyterian Homes
v. Division of Tax Appeals, 55 N.J. 275, 261 A.2d 143 (1970), and Catholic Charities v. City of
Pleasantville, 109 N.J. Super. 475, 263 A.2d 803 (1970). In the latter case the court stated,
"Implicit in the opinion of the Division are findings that Residence performs a charitable function
that benefits the public-at-large inasmuch as the burden of taxation is lessened by obviating the
necessity on the part of the government to construct facilities to accommodate the poor who are
unacceptable to or who cannot afford the rates charged by nursing homes operating for profit."
Id. at 806. It is noteworthy that while New Jersey has granted hospitals a specific tax exemption
as a class, where institutions must qualify as "charitable," service to the poor is required.
85. 42 U.S.C. § 291c(e) (Supp. V, 1970).
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class of that legislation."' Indeed, the 1970 amendments establishing certain
priorities for poverty areas indicate an increased concern. 7 In the Medicaid
program, inpatient and outpatient hospital services are mandatory."8 Viewing
tax policy in this broader social and political context mandates that benefits
of tax-exempt status be limited only to those institutions that also provide
services to persons who cannot pay, including those not covered by Medicare
and Medicaid, or whose coverage under those programs or private insurance
has been exhausted. Consistency with congressional policies providing health
care to the poor under Medicaid and Hill-Burton requires that Congress limit
subsidization to those hospitals which assist it by not rejecting the poor.89
86. Cook v. Ochsner, 319 F. Supp. 603 (E.D. La. 1970). The basic underlying predicate of
all allegations in this case involves the refusal of all private hospitals and the two district hospitals
to admit the poor, including the poor covered by the Medicaid program, casting the entire burden
upon the public Charity Hospital of Louisiana at New Orleans which admittedly does not have
the resources to care for all the poor. Three other lawsuits have been commenced on the same
issue of hospitals, constructed under the federal Hill-Burton program, refusing to admit the poor.
Organized Migrants v. James Archer Smith Hosp., 325 F. Supp. 268 (S.D. Fla. 1970); Euresti
v. Stenner, Civil No. C-2462 (D. Colo. 1970); Perry v. Greater Southeast Community Hosp., Civil
No. 275-70 (D.D.C. 1970). In Organized Migrants, the Florida court has agreed with the Louisiana
court that poor people have standing to challenge the failure of Hill-Burton hospitals to treat them.
In Colorado the court disagreed, and an appeal has been noted.
87. Public Health Service Act, Title VI, Pub. L. 91-296, §§ 603(a)(4), 645(a)(4)).
88. 42 U.S.C. § 1396a(a)(13)(D) (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1970). A subsidiary question
to the basic issue concerns a hospital's response to the Medicaid program. Bromberg appears to
take issue with a statement he attributes to former Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare
Wilbur Cohen that a charitable hospital should not follow a policy of regularly refusing admission
to Medicaid patients; Bromberg states that:
A hospital may adopt a policy of not providing care for Medicaid patients for various
reasons. A principal one is that while Medicaid may be based on a cost reimbursement
formula, many states rapidly use up the funds designated for health care, and then expect
the hospitals to take whatever token payment is available for Medicaid patients for the
balance of the year. Officials in those states rarely inquire where the hospital will obtain
the funds necessary to meet the increasing costs of caring for these patients. Since they
are dealing with 'charitable' institutions, they expect the difference to be made up by
contributions . ...
20 CATHOLIC U. L. REV. at 251.
Aside from its inherent "rejection-of-the-poor" thesis, this statement indicates a lack of
familiarity with the requirements of the Medicaid program that a participating state must provide
reasonable costs of inpatient hospital services for beneficiaries of that program, 42 U.S.C.
§ 1396a(a)(13)(D) (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1970). When the State of New York attempted
to set a ceiling on that amount, that attempt was voided. Catholic Medical Center v. Rockefeller,
305 F. Supp. 1256 (E.D.N.Y. 1969), affd, 430 F.2d 1297 (2d Cir.1970). The Second Circuit said
in this regard:
As long as the state participates in a plan for medical assistance to the medically indigent
under the provisions of Title XIX of the Social Security Act, it must provide for pay-
ments to hospitals of the full actual and current costs of inpatient hospital services fur-
nished to eligible individuals, including retroactive payments or an allowance in lieu of
retroactive payments.
430 F.2d at 1299.
89. It would appear more in keeping with the policies and philosophies of Congress which
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The argument for bestowing tax-exempt status on hospitals which do not
afford service for persons unable to pay are set forth in the testimony of the
American Hospital Association before the House Ways and Means Committee
in February 1969. As already described, AHA contended that Sections 501(c)
(3) and 170 should be amended: (I) because of the uncertainty in the amount
of free care required, (2) because universities, symphony orchestras, and jazz
festivals were tax exempt without regard to relief of the poor, (3) because of
an alleged inconsistency between the 1956 ruling and the Treasury Regulations
on the subject, and (4) because of Scott's position that health per se was a
charitable object for trusts. These contentions do not meet the policy
considerations discussed above, nor do they withstand analysis.
With respect to uncertainty in the amount of free care required, the argument
that free care should be deleted as a requirement because there are no guidelines
could be dispatched simply by establishing guidelines. The exempt status of
universities, as well as symphony orchestras and jazz festivals exist under the
category of "education," which historically has always been separate from
"charitable" under both the law of trusts and the federal tax statutes.'
Although Congress could also create a separate category for hospitals, as AHA
unsuccessfully sought in 1969, Congress has not so acted; the Commissioner's
ruling must be interpreted within the Code as it exists. As for policy considera-
tions, the argument that the Code should be amended to include hospitals
which charge all patients because universities, or symphony orchestras, or jazz
festivals charge all their "customers" avoids the special policy considerations
applicable to hospitals in the context of congressional concern for health-
delivery programs. Each class of claimants for special tax benefits should
stand or fall, independent of every other class, and dependent only on the
impact upon society of acquiescence to its claim.
It is notable that while universities are seeking ways to expand opportunities
for the admission of the poor through scholarships and loan programs,
hospitals are seeking to erect a financial barrier through pre-admission deposits.
The issue of tax exemption without provision for free services is hardly likely
to arise when, in fact, the institution does afford such services. It arises in the
passed the Medicaid statute to deny tax exemption to hospitals which refuse to participate in that
program and fail to admit even those poor for whom the government pays. Further, granting tax
exemption to hospitals which deny admission to poor persons arguably may be a denial of equal
protection. See Loredo v. Sierra View Dist. Hosp., Civil No. 67414 (Sup. Ct., Tulare County,
Feb. 5, 1969) CCH MEDICARE & MEDICAID REP. 26,198. Cf Green v. Kennedy, 309 F. Supp.
1127 (D.D.C. 1970). Tax exemption and deduction advantages may subject an otherwise private
organization to constitutional obligations, and the grant of tax-exempt status may be considered
as an indirect subsidization not too unlike a Hill-Burton grant.
90. See Rev. Rul. 64-175, 1964-1 CUM. BULL. 185 for history dating back to 1919 that cultural
activities are educational under Section 501 (c) (3).
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hospital area precisely because a financial barrier has been erected even as
protestations of "public trust" have been voiced by AHA spokesmen about
their colleagues in the hospital business.
With respect to AHA's argument that the "relief of the poor" obligation
is inconsistent with the Treasury Regulation implementing Section 501(c) (3),
it should be noted that Section 1.501(c) (3) 1(d) (2) of the tax regulations
provides:
Charitable defined. The term 'charitable' is used in section 501(c)(3)
in its generally accepted legal sense and is, therefore, not to be
construed as limited by the separate enumeration in section 501(c)(3)
of other tax exempt purposes which may fall within the broad
outlines of 'charity' as developed by judicial decision. Such a term
includes: Relief of the poor and distressed or of the underprivileged;
advancement of religion; advancement of public buildings,
monuments, or works; lessening the burdens of Government; and
promotion of social welfare by organizations designed to accomplish
any of the above purposes, or (i) to lessen neighborhood tensions;
(ii) to eliminate prejudice and discrimination; (iii) to defend human
and civil rights secured by law; or (iv) to combat commuity
deterioration and juvenile delinquency .... 1
To be sure the list includes purposes other than "relief of the poor." However,
none of the purposes therein specifically listed is fulfilled by institutions that
require remuneration for their services. Recently, IRS made it clear that public
interest law firms, in order to qualify for charitable status under Section
501(c)(3), must restrict their representation to cases involving public interest
causes which are not "fee-generating," except in an amicus capacity.92 On the
other hand, it appears inconsistent for IRS to afford charitable status to a
hospital which charges all its customers (and is in competition with proprietary
hospitals).
With respect to defining "charitable" in its "generally accepted legal sense,"
to the extent there is any doubt, its historic meaning, both in the legal and
popular senses, is relief of the poor and not assistance to nonprofit fee-charging
institutions which may be benevolent. Indeed, "benevolent" was a purpose not
accepted by the draftsmen in 1913 and never incorporated into the statute. The
Commissioner cannot by regulation amend the Code; regulations must be
construed within the meaning of the statutory provisions they-implement or
are themselves void.
93
91. Treas. Reg. § 1.501(c)(3)1(d)(2)(1970).
92. See Guidelines for Tax-exempt Organizations, New York Times, Nov. 12, 1970, at 23,
col. I.
93. Cf Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Commissioner, 383 U.S. 372 (1966). The reliance of AHA
concerning the position of Scott on health as a charitable purpose has already been refuted above.
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The basic contention of the American Hospital Association, and indeed the
underlying contention of Robert Bromberg's community benefit approach,94
is that hospital services are per se entitled to charitable status, as long as they
do not confer private benefits on stockholders. This basic contention
underscores why the revenue ruling is legally incorrect. The requirement of no
private benefit is separately stated in Sections 501(c)(3) and 170, to the effect
that "no part of net earnings of which inures to the benefit of any private
shareholder or individual," and has been part of the federal tax laws since the
1909 corporation excise tax.95 It applies to all categories, i.e., educational,
scientific, religious, testing-for public safety, literary, and the prevention of
cruelty to children or animals, as well as charitable. Arguably proprietary
hospitals are also performing a community health function, and are doing so
while paying substantial federal, state, and local taxes. 9 If the obligation to
provide free services to persons unable to pay is removed from nonprofit
hospitals, the only true legal difference between the two categories is that of
dividends and other similar benefits to the stockholders. But that difference
is covered by the separate clause in the Code, and is not dependent upon any
meaning inherent in the words "charitable," or "scientific" or "educational."
The argument that does not appear in either the AHA testimony nor Robert
Bromberg's article, but which underlies the object of the AHA in seeking an
amendment to the Code, relates to the enormous inflation in the cost of health
care delivery. As noted in the introduction, the rise in health care costs has
far out-distanced the rise in the cost of living in the past decade. Historically,
paying patients absorbed the costs of charity patients, over and above that
portion of charity covered by contributors. Based on the philosophy that
Medicare and Medicaid would relieve hospitals from a significant portion of
formerly charity patients, 7 charity and bad debts attributable to non-Medicare
and non-Medicaid patients are not permitted to be absorbed into the
"reasonable costs" of Medicare and Medicaid.9 8
Therefore, the question becomes who pays the costs of charitable care. Local
property owners may bear the burden through a system of "double taxation"
in that their tax payments operate directly to support the public hospital and
indirectly subsidize the private hospital which is relieved of its tax burdens and
shares in the costs of government because it qualifies as "charitable" under
94. Although Bromberg contends that his "community benefit" approach requires more than
mere nonprofit dedication to health, its actual substance amounts merely to that.
95. Law of August 5, 1909, § 38, 36 Stat. 11.
96. See note 39 supra.
97. Hearings on Medicare and Medicaid before the Subcomm. on Medicare and Medicaid
of the Senate Comm. on Finance, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 377 (1970).
98. See 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(v)(l)(A) (1964), as amended, (Supp. V, 1970).
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the IRS ruling although it does not lessen the burden on government by caring
for any of the poor. The paying patient, who pays a proportionately higher
cost in order to "cover" the losses which stem from charity service to the poor,
may also bear the burden. A third possibility is that all patients, both rich
and poor, share the burden where the hospital does not undertake certain
selective "improvements" or foregoes purchasing highly expensive machines,
so that a portion of' its revenues or capital assets may be devoted to charity
care. A fourth possibility is that the poor bear the burden at the cost of their
lives and health in a dual health system which cannot "afford" to care for
them. A final possibility relates to financing health and hospital care through
an outside mechanism. This is the subject to which the House Ways and Means
Committee and Senate Finance Committee are presently addressing themselves.
The method to be chosen depends upon the valuations of society, but whichever
it is, it is a matter which should be addressed to a legislative resolution and
should not be disposed of through an informal interpretive bulletin by an agency
without the legal power or perspective to view the impact of its action upon
the country's health crisis.
Conclusion
This article began with an summarization of the health crisis in the United
States, and the incongrous fact that the population of the wealthiest nation
in the world has an astonishingly poor health status compared to other
developed countries.9" The bleakest part of this picture belongs to the poor.
Revenue Ruling 69-545 was issued under questionable legal authority, and,
most significantly, without regard to its health consequences. If the objective
of Congress, from the enactment of Medicare and Medicaid through all the
varied legislative proposals which it is now considering, is to eliminate the dual
health system and truly to make health care accessible to all, the tax policies
expressed by IRS through. that ruling run counter to that objective.
Private hospitals often stand as "foreign" enclaves in poor central cities;
admission to them is limited to the "magic" of being a private patient of a
staff physician. Such staff physicians and their private patients reside in the
affluent suburbs. In order to meet their obligations in the past, many of these
hospitals operated clinics (albeit too often inadequate). Through these clinics
the poor of the inner city could gain access to the mainstream medicine which
99. A lawsuit has been instituted by five organizations representing poor people in various
locations in the United States (including California, Kentucky, West Virginia, the Appalachian
States generally, and the country as a whole through the National Tenants' Organization) and
by nine individuals from Arizona, Louisiana, and Kentucky challenging the ruling. Eastern
Kentucky Welfare Rights Org. v. Connally, Civil No. 1378-71 (D.D.C., filed Feb. 5, 1971).
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is lauded by its defenders. The removal of these obligations has allowed the
elimination of this one access route despite the protestations of the AHA
spokesmen before the House Ways and Means Committee in February 1969
and the Senate Finance Committee in May 1970. Like Senator Ribicoff, I find
that result "abhorrent." Rather than the encouragement and imaginative
development of more effective means to bring the poor into the health delivery
system, this Ruling has shut the door. It not only should be legally overturned;
it would be a most inappropriate amendment to the Tax Code.
